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Economic predictors of differences in interview faking between countries: Economic 
inequality matters, not the state of the economy 
 
Abstract 
Many companies recruit employees from different parts of the globe, and faking behavior by 
potential employees is a ubiquitous phenomenon. It seems that applicants from some 
countries are more prone to faking compared to others, but the reasons for these differences 
are largely unexplored. This study relates country-level economic variables to faking 
behavior in hiring processes. In a cross-national study across 20 countries, participants (N = 
3839) reported their faking behavior in their last job interview. This study used the random 
response technique (RRT) to ensure participants anonymity and to foster honest answers 
regarding faking behavior. Results indicate that general economic indicators (gross domestic 
product per capita [GDP] and unemployment rate) show negligible correlations with faking 
across the countries, whereas economic inequality is positively related to the extent of 
applicant faking to a substantial extent. These findings imply that people are sensitive to 
inequality within countries and that inequality relates to faking, because inequality might 
actuate other psychological processes (e.g., envy) which in turn increase the probability for 
unethical behavior in many forms.  
 
Keywords: faking; cross-cultural differences; income inequality; GDP; unemployment 
Areas of applied psychology the results apply: Personnel selection, cross-cultural studies 
Countries of data collection: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, People’s Republic of China, 
Fiji, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United States of America 
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When applicants are interviewed for a job, they do not always represent their true abilities and 
skills, some opt to fake: They intentionally distort or even falsify their responses to create a 
specific impression (Levashina & Campion, 2006). Faking occurs not only in interviews but 
also in personality tests (e.g., Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006), and it 
is a phenomenon about which many practitioners are concerned (e.g., Robie, Tuzinski, & Bly, 
2006) because applicants who fake gain an unfair advantage over non-faking applicants.  
Faking has already been established as a phenomenon whose extent varies between 
countries (e.g., Bye et al., 2011; Fell & König, 2016; Fell, König, & Kammerhoff, 2016; Frei, 
Yoshita, & Isaacson, 2006; König, Wong, & Cen, 2012). These differences between countries 
are relevant for all organizations that recruit in more than one country ranging from small 
companies that are situated at the border of two countries and thus have employees from both 
countries, to large organizations such as the European Union that try to attract applicants from 
all member states (see Christensen, 2015).  
Despite the importance of these differences in faking tendencies between countries, 
attempts to explain these differences are rare. In this paper, we argue that economic variables 
(e.g., unemployment rates) are correlated with these differences in interview faking. 
Therefore, we link economic predictors to prevalence rates of interview faking in 20 
countries. We measure faking prevalence with the randomized response technique (RRT) that 
has been developed for the measurement of sensitive topics. The RRT prevents researchers 
from being able to identify whether a response by a participant was due to a randomization 
device (in our case: dice) or due to their actual behavior (Fox & Tracy, 1986). Such 
conditions increase the likelihood of honest answers and, thus, have been applied to research 
applicants’ faking behavior in the past (e.g., Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003). 
Economic predictors of faking differences between countries 
National state of the economy. Several theories (e.g., Marcus, 2009; McFarland & 
Ryan, 2000) argue that situational factors influence faking, with the state of the economy 
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being an important situational aspect. The argument being that a healthier economy reduces 
the motivation to fake. When a country’s economy is doing well, applicants may assume that 
many organizations are hiring because there are many job advertisements. This shifts the 
hiring market power towards the applicants. Consequently, applicants may have a reduced 
need to exaggerate their abilities. In other words, in countries that have a healthy economy 
and many vacancies (possibly even more vacancies than applicants), applicants should have 
fewer reasons to fake than in countries where people are struggling to find a job. 
There are a few possible indicators for the state of the economy of a country. In 
particular, many cross-cultural studies have used the gross domestic product per capita (GDP) 
as their operationalization of the state of the economy of a country (see, e.g., Heath, Richards, 
& de Graaf, 2016). GDP per capita can be defined as the value of all final goods and services 
of a country divided by its population in a year in current US$, and it allows for the 
comparison of living conditions across countries (World Bank, n.d.). Prior research has found 
the GDP to be negatively related to several kinds of unethical behaviors (e.g., corruption, You 
& Khagram, 2005, and academic cheating, Orosz et al., 2018). Even more importantly, Robie, 
Emmons, Tuzinski, and Kantrowitz (2011) reported higher scale means in a personality test 
developed for front-line leaders during a recession compared to prior to the recession.  
One could also argue that it is the unemployment rate, another indicator for the state of 
the economy of a country that might affect applicants faking behavior. Although applicants 
might be more or less aware of the general state of the economy of their country, they 
primarily care about getting a job, and a high unemployment rate increases the importance of 
finding a job (König, Hafsteinsson, Jansen, & Stadelmann, 2011; Marcus, 2009; but see Fell 
et al., 2016).  
Thus, we hypothesize: The lower the GDP per capita (H1a) and the higher the 
unemployment rate (H1b) of a country, the more people in a country engage in interview 
faking. 
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Economic inequality. It might also be possible that it is not the state of the economy 
per se, but economic inequality that triggers unethical behavior such as faking: The 
differences between the rich and the poor within a country might psychologically matter more 
than the average state of the economy of a country. In particular, less affluent people in high-
inequality countries have more to win if they are successful in the world of work, for example 
by getting well-paid jobs, whereas affluent people in high-inequality countries might have 
more to lose if they are not successful (Buttrick & Oishi, 2017; You & Khagram, 2005). 
These arguments are bolstered by the empirical finding of country-level differences in 
economic inequality being positively related to country-level differences in corruption 
(Zhang, Cao, & Vaughn, 2009), software piracy (Husted, 2000), and crime in general (Pratt & 
Cullen, 2005). Furthermore, economic inequality might also trigger the people’s perception 
that they live in a very competitive world, and competitiveness has been argued (Roulin, 
Krings, & Binggeli, 2016) and shown to be related to interview faking (e.g., Roulin & Krings, 
2016; Schilling, Roulin, Obschonka, & König, 2020). Consequently, living in a country with 
high inequality might make faking a particularly attractive strategy to get ahead.  
Thus, we hypothesize: The higher the economic inequality of a country, the more 
people in a country engage in interview faking (H2). 
Method 
Sample  
Students and recent graduates in 20 countries were asked about their faking behavior 
during their most recent application (for country details see Table 1). Data were mostly 
collected directly by the collaborators using online surveys (see Table 1). The data for the 
People’s Republic of China have been published in König et al. (2012), the data for 
Switzerland in König et al. (2011), and the data for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 
Husain, Dayan, Pathak, Langer, and König (2018). For these three countries, the raw data 
were available and re-analyzed for the current publication. The data for Iceland and the U.S. 
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were directly taken from König et al. (2011) and Donovan et al. (2003), respectively. The 
final sample (see Table 1 for exclusion of participants) consisted of N = 3839 applicants from 
20 countries. Across countries, the mean age was 23.28 (SD = 6.07), 59.9% were female; 
20.7% indicated that they had already experienced one or two job interviews in their life, and 
61.4% indicated that they already had three or more job interviews in their life. Most of the 
participants were undergraduates (36.1%), nearly as many were graduate students (31.8%), 
and a smaller percentage already had their master’s degree, a comparable or a higher degree 
(10.2%). Further details about all samples can be found in Table 2.  
----Tables 1 & 2---- 
Procedure 
To introduce the participants to the topic of job interviews, the questionnaire started 
with five items about their experience with their most recent job interview. Two sample items 
for this phase were “When did your last job interview take place?” and “How strongly did you 
wish to get the job?” Next, participants were introduced to the RRT technique. We explained 
that the technique ensures anonymity because the answers to the RRT items depend on a 
randomization device (dice in our case) and that no researcher is able to identify if the answer 
participants give are caused by the randomization device or by answering truthfully. In our 
case, participants were instructed to mark the response option “true” if the dice showed 1 or 2 
regardless of their own behavior and to give the correct (truthful) answer if the dice showed 
the other four faces. Furthermore, we explained to them that researchers can only use these 
RRT data at the group level because they know that one third of all dice throws results on 
average on participants crossing “true.” After these introductions, participants provided 
answers to 14 items about their behavior in the last interview. To ensure comparability across 
papers (Donovan et al., 2003; Husain et al., 2018; König et al., 2011; König et al., 2012), this 
paper focuses on the 11 items that were asked in all countries; these items can be found in 
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Table 3. The questionnaire ended with several demographic questions. (The procedure was 
slightly different in Iceland and in the U.S., see Donovan et al., 2003, and König et al., 2011.) 
----Table3---- 
Economic indicators 
GDP per capita, unemployment, and inequality. GDP, unemployment, and 
inequality data for each country were obtained from the World Bank Open Data webpage 
(World Bank, n.d.). If the relevant year (i.e., the year in which the data was collected) was not 
available in the World Bank Open Data bank, other sources were consulted (CEIC Data, n.d.; 
DeNavas-Walt, Cleveland, & Webster, 2003; Laenderdaten, n.d.). For three countries, no 
inequality data could be located for the same year as the data collection and we thus used the 
data available for any prior year closest to the data collection (i.e., for New Zealand [a three-
year lag], India [a one-year lag], and Fiji [a four-year lag]). Although inequality can be 
measured in several ways, researchers seem to have agreed that the best way to do so is to use 
the national Gini index (e.g., Bleidorn et al., 2016; Steptoe, Ardle, Tsuda, & Tanaka, 2007; 
You & Khagram, 2005). This index ranges from 0 (i.e., perfect income equality within a 
country) to 100 (i.e., perfect inequality).  
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
For all countries where we had raw data we used the same criteria to exclude 
participants with questionable data: (a) if participants were incomplete, (b) if they reported 
that they did not predominantly live in the country of data collection, (c) if they did not have 
at least one interview in the last year, (d) if they reported that their skill in the language of the 
questionnaire was lower than intermediate, (e) if they admitted that they did not or just 
partially followed the instructions of the RRT, (f) if they produced inconsistent data (e.g., if 
they mentioned that they had had a job interview in the demographics section, but, when they 
were asked the same question in the RRT section they answered “no”) (see also Table 1). 
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Table 3 reports the RRT corrected percentages of agreement to each item for each of 
the 20 countries (for calculating these percentages see the Appendix). To prevent having to 
correlate the economic predictors with single items with unknown reliability, we averaged all 
11 items and thus created an overall faking score for each country. Reliability of this overall 
faking score at the country-level was Cronbach’s α = .88.  
Tests of hypotheses 
Table 4 shows means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables. As can be 
seen, interview faking did neither significantly correlate with either GDP per capita (r = -.10, 
p = .68) nor with unemployment (r = -.16, p =.50), but is significantly and strongly correlated 
with inequality (r = .53, p < .05). These results do not provide support for Hypotheses 1a and 
1b but do support Hypothesis 2.  
----Table 4---- 
Discussion 
This study investigated the correlation between country-level economic variables and 
interview faking tendencies for 20 countries from a wide range of world regions. Our findings 
show that indicators of economic wealth of a country (i.e., GDP, unemployment rates) were 
not related to faking, whereas an indicator of economic inequality within the countries was 
strongly associated with faking. On average, people from countries with high economic 
inequality also reported more faking in job interviews. 
The results of this study highlight the importance of economic inequality for faking. In 
countries where there is more inequality, where the gap between rich and poor is wider, 
people seem to be more inclined to fake, possibly because they have more to gain or to lose 
depending on the income strata in which they are currently situated (You & Khagram, 2005). 
Similar to prior research (Pratt & Cullen, 2005, Zhang et al., 2009) our results indicate that 
inequality matters and that inequality can drive people to engage in unethical behavior. Our 
results are also consistent with the argument that inequality might trigger the perception that 
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applicants have to compete against each other, because perceived competition is also known 
to be linked to interview faking (Roulin & Krings, 2016). It seems also plausible that 
inequality and faking reciprocally influence each other: Not only might inequality push 
people towards increasing their chances to get a job through questionable behavior, faking 
might give some people undeserved access to well-paid jobs, which subsequently leads to 
further inequality (see also You & Khagram, 2005). In addition, if inequality is large, less 
affluent people might particularly envy the affluent ones and conclude that it is not fair that 
the affluent are so wealthy, possibly by luck or due to their family background or even by 
engaging in unethical behavior, and that others are left behind (Ben-Ze'ev, 1992; de Vries, 
Pathak, van Gelder, & Singh, 2017; Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973). It is possible that the 
concentrated power by the wealthy in income unequal countries even leads to country-level 
norms of “anything goes,” which would then lead to applicants feeling more free to do 
whatever it takes (including faking) to get a job (cf. Gino & Pierce, 2009). Interestingly, we 
found strong effects for inequality despite the fact that the students and recent graduates who 
participated in our study likely did not belong to the class of very poor in their countries 
because university education is often rather expensive. Although this fact operates against the 
hypothesized relationship (making for a more conservative test of our hypothesis), it should 
be noted that inequality also persists between university students: Some cannot afford to go to 
their favorite or the most prestigious university; others need to take student loans and pay off 
their student debt for the rest of their lives, whereas students who are better off start into their 
professional lives without concerns about debt. Although we acknowledge that inequality 
between university students might be less salient than between the overall population of a 
country, perceived economic inequality still effects university students, which might lead to 
faking behavior.  
In contrast to the findings for the inequality index, no relationship was found for two 
of the most important national economic indicators--GDP per capita and unemployment (the 
INTERVIEW FAKING IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 12 
correlation with unemployment even went into the wrong direction). This means that 
economic wealth might be unrelated to applicants’ faking behavior, which could be explained 
by the following two factors. First, the GDP and the unemployment rate are rather coarse 
indicators of individual wealth within a country, and even if the GDP rises this might only be 
because the wealthy get even wealthier (which might especially be true in countries with low 
income equality; see Buttrick & Oishi, 2017). Second, even if, for example, Brazilian 
applicants are aware of the state of the Brazilian economy, they might not compare the wealth 
of Brazil with the wealth of, for example, Iceland and thus might not conclude that they are 
relatively poor. Unemployment rates did not affect faking behavior either. Thus, applicants 
might be aware of the challenges involved in getting a job without responding to these 
challenges through more faking. Perhaps unemployment is a less serious reason for people to 
envy other people (i.e., others who have a job) than economic inequality (Ben-Ze'ev, 1992; 
Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Hamilton, 1988).  
To summarize, our findings indicate that people are more sensitive to inequality than 
to general economic indicators when it comes to faking – it is not the overall economic wealth 
of a country that is driving faking behavior but how that wealth is distributed (although it 
should be kept in mind that this interpretation of our results is based on correlational data). If 
people perceive that there is inequality in the country, this might evoke unethical behavior 
(see also Pratt & Cullen, 2005, and Zhang et al., 2009). More generally spoken, it seems that 
inequality is more likely to lead to other psychological processes (e.g., envy and 
competitiveness) that trigger faking than the general state of the economy within a country. 
Limitations and future research 
At least four limitations deserve being mentioned. First, the design of our study is 
correlational and thus does not allow causal conclusions. Second, more consistency in the way 
data were collected would have been preferable, but practical challenges in doing multi-
national research makes consistency difficult to achieve, and for such practical reasons, many 
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large surveys (e.g., Transparency International’s Global Corruption Index, Hardoon & 
Heinrich, 2013) use, for instance, face-to-face plus online methods to collect data. Third, all 
our participants were either current students and recent graduates with only some experience 
in applying for jobs. It remains open, how much the results generalize to older job seekers and 
how well one sample can represent a country, and future research should thus try to collect 
data from older and more diverse samples. Fourth, the use of the RRT has clearly benefits 
(i.e., higher anonymity), but it comes with the challenge that a considerable number of 
participants in every country did not or only partially followed the instructions. An additional 
disadvantage is that the RRT does not allow analyzing data at the individual level, which 
means that measurement equivalence cannot be statistically established (cf. Boer, Hanke, & 
He, 2018). 
Future research should include additional variables beyond economic predictors that 
were the focus of this study. In particular, previous research has suggested that cross-country 
differences in faking correlates with three cultural dimensions of humane orientation, in-
group collectivism, and gender egalitarianism (Fell & König, 2016; Fell et al., 2016; see also 
Fell & König, 2018). Furthermore, future research should also study other kinds of ethically 
questionable behavior within the field of personnel selection (e.g., applicants unfairly using 
their influence and networks to get job interview invitations) and beyond and explore possible 
links to economic inequality. In addition, one could argue that the increased prevalence of 
fake news (at least in some countries) might make faking in personnel selection situations 
more acceptable, which could be empirically tested. Finally, future research could also 
examine how applicants adapt their application strategies when they are recruited in other 
countries than their home countries. This would allow exploring how much the home country 
has shaped their application behavior. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to investigate relations of country-level economic variables 
and faking behavior. Our results show that there are differences between the countries in 
faking behavior and that inequality between the rich and poor within a country are correlated 
with faking behavior. Cross-national companies searching for employees across countries 
should be aware of such country-level differences. Moreover, our study provides further 
evidence that people are sensitive to inequality - more than to general economic wealth 
standards within a country. 
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Table 1 
Information about the Sampling Process 
Country Language of 
the survey 
Administration form Exclusion of participants because of… Final n 
   …not 
predominantly 
living in the 
country 
…never having 
an interview or 
more than a year 
ago 
…language 
skills lower 
than 
intermediate 
…not or only 
partially 
following 
instructions 
…incon-
sistencies 
 
Austria German Online 26 0 0 67 0 128 
Belgium Dutch Online 131 0 1 22 0 143 
Brazil Brazilian 
Portuguese 
Online 1 0 0 39 0 94 
Canada English Online 33 0 3 88 5 460 
China Chinese Paper/Pencil a - 140 - - 6 182 
Fiji English Online 9 3 11 44 11 171 
Georgia Georgian Online 16 0 0 202 3 232 
Germany German Online 7 0 - 72 6 214 
Iceland  Paper/Pencil b      245 
India English Online, Paper/Pencil a 2 155 20 42 8 87 
Italy Italian Online 0 0 0 18 2 93 
Japan Japanese Online 6 0 8 71 5 514 
Netherlands Dutch Online 5 0 0 25 1 126 
New Zealand English Online 31 0 2 57 2 151 
Romania Romanian Online 5 0 2 57 0 106 
Russia Russian Online 3 1 - 52 2 95 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Country Language of 
the survey 
Administration form Exclusion of participants because of… Final n 
   …not 
predominantly 
living in the 
country 
…never having 
an interview or 
more than a year 
ago 
…language 
skills lower 
than 
intermediate 
…not or only 
partially 
following 
instructions 
…incon-
sistencies 
 
Spain Spanish Online 4 70 - 6 5 168 
Switzerland German Online - 155 - 48 5 298 
United Arab 
Emirates 
English Online 9 28 1 9 23 111 
United States of 
America 
English Paper/Pencil b - - - - - 221 
Note. Exclusion because of inconsistencies means that participants stated that they had a job but indicated in the RRT question “I am 
currently” employed that they do not have a job. A “-“ indicates that the data was missing or questions were not asked during the study (see 
in particular Donovan et al., 2003; König et al., 2011; König et al., 2012). 
a Participants threw real dice (provided by the research team). 
b Participants were given a randomly generated list of “1” and “0” and asked to mark the response option “true” if there was a “1” on their 
list and to give the correct (truthful) answer if the list showed a “0”. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Information  
Country No. of 
males 
No. of 
females 
Age  Experience with job interviews  Category of students % of participants who stated 
that they strongly or very 
strongly wanted to get the job    M SD  1-2 job 
interviews 
3 or more job 
interviews 
 UG GR PG 
Austria 32 96 25.66 5.13  21 107  66 11 42 72.7 
Belgium 29 113 23.27 3.58  50 93  5 72 38 86.8 
Brazil 45 49 21.94 3.98  32 62  15 71 3 84.0 
Canada 213 247 20.33 1.52  92 368  401 36 4 77.8 
China 67 115 24.35 3.14  31 151  - - - - 
Fiji 69 102 28.05 15.06  36 145  39 49 79 79.5 
Georgia 52 173 20.23 2.90  84 144  98 119 11 79.0 
Germany 60 153 25.18 4.94  50 164  111 24 62 77.1 
Iceland 162 83 20-40 -  - -  - - - - 
India 50 38 22.6 4.00  48 40  2 71 14 56.8 
Italy 37 56 25.38 3.35  32 61  17 36 37 73.2 
Japan 253 261 22.11 1.22  - 285  309 184 18 44.8 
Netherlands 20 106 24.64 5.92  27 99  32 51 32 85.9 
New Zealand 61 86 22.49 5.00  52 99  101 34 8 67.5 
Romania 14 92 23.06 2.83  30 78  39 41 28 65.8 
Russia 27 67 21.90 4.52  15 80  16 46 - 61.5 
Spain 72 96 22.51 3.27  56 112  48 85 5 81.6 
Switzerland 127 171 27.46 4.17  98 200  90 190 83.8 
United Arab Emirates 54 57 30.31 3.89  41 70  - 100 9 79.3 
United States of America 91 130 19.21 -  - -  - - - - 
Note. UG = undergraduate students, GR = graduate students, PG = post-graduates. A “-“ indicates that the data are missing or questions were not asked during the study. 
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Table 3 
Interview faking prevalences  
No. Item AT BE BR CA CN FJ GG GE IC IN IT JA NE NZ RO RU SP SW UAE US 
1. I overemphasized or exaggerated my positive 
attributes during the application process (e.g., 
hardworking, detail orientation, efficiency). 
19% 23% 7% 54% 36% 57% 4% 12% 17% 45% 50% 48% 31% 47% 4% 37% 38% 6% 18% 56% 
2. I outright fabricated or made up information about 
myself when applying for the job so as to maximize 
the chances of me getting hired for the job. 
6% 0% 0% 3% 12% 16% 0% 0% 0% 17% 15% 12% 0% 0% 0% 18% 37% 0% 22% 17% 
3. When applying for the job, I exaggerated my work 
experience to make myself look more impressive 
than I really am.  
6% 10% 4% 31% 40% 21% 2% 16% 8% 10% 24% 23% 12% 23% 0% 1% 28% 1% 15% 45% 
4. When applying for the job, I claimed to have 
experience that I didn’t actually have. 
0% 9% 3% 2% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 4% 29% 0% 12% 23% 
5. When applying for the job, I claimed to have 
knowledge that I did not have. 
0% 2% 12% 8% 13% 0% 0% 12% 14% 7% 11% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 16% 0% 19% 16% 
6. When applying for the job, I exaggerated my past 
work or performance evaluations to make myself 
look like a better employee. 
11% 19% 15% 33% 43% 26% 0% 4% 0% 34% 3% 29% 12% 23% 1% 18% 20% 5% 27% 30% 
7. When applying for the job, I exaggerated my skills 
to my benefit. 
30% 32% 20% 48% 48% 49% 0% 31% 23% 34% 15% 29% 31% 36% 8% 19% 33% 13% 24% 51% 
8. When applying for the job, I exaggerated qualities 
or characteristics of myself such as dependability 
and reliability. 
9% 12% 27% 20% 38% 50% 0% 10% 25% 28% 18% 38% 15% 25% 0% 18% 28% 6% 22% 47% 
9. When applying for the job, I gave false opinions. 17% 17% 23% 0% 37% 0% 0% 23% 2% 2% 2% 31% 15% 0% 14% 05% 13% 0% 11% 43% 
10. When applying for the job, I tried to portray myself 
as more agreeable (trusting, empathetic, 
cooperative) than I really am. 
26% 40% 68% 32% 92% 27% 5% 27% 18% 24% 40% 61% 39% 34% 21% 48% 54% 13% 31% 41% 
11. When applying for the job, I tended to de-emphasize 
or “play down” what some might consider my 
negative attributes.  
52% 62% 82% 54% 72% 30% 33% 54% 40% 34% 50% 52% 58% 73% 38% 45% 34% 49% 22% 62% 
Note. AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, BR = Brazil, CA = Canada, CN = China, FJ = Fiji, GG = Georgia, GE = Germany, IC = Iceland, IN = India, IT = Italy, JA = Japan, NE = Netherlands, NZ = New 
Zealand, RO = Romania, RU = Russia, SP = Spain, SW = Switzerland, UAE= United Arab Emirates, US = United States of America. The data for Iceland and the U.S. were directly taken from König 
et al. (2011) and Donovan et al. (2003), respectively. 
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Table 4 
Correlations 
Measures M SD  1  2  3 
1. Mean interview faking .22 .09    
2. GDP per capita 31.68 19.73 -.10   
3. Unemployment 7.19 5.09 -.16 -.15  
4. Income inequality 36.35 6.97  .53* -.58* -.02 
Note. N = 20 countries (with 3813 participants) with the exception of the correlations 
with income inequality where N = 19 because the Gini coefficient of the United Arab 
Emirates is unknown. GDP = gross domestic product per capita in thousand U.S. 
dollar.  
* p < .05, two-tailed 
  
INTERVIEW FAKING IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES  24 
Appendix 
How to Calculate RRT Corrected Percentages of Agreement 
The following example explains how the RRT corrected percentages of agreement to each 
item was calculated. Imagine we collected data from 12 people in Avalon and asked the 
participating Avalonians to throw a die before answering whether they used witchcraft to 
make a better impression in their last job interview. We instructed all of them to tick “yes” 
when the die showed a 1 or a 2 and to answer truthfully otherwise, which means that 1/3 
should tick “yes” just because of the dice. Looking at the data, we find that 8 Avalonians 
ticked “yes” and 4 “no”. Because 1/3 equals the probability of being forced by the dice to tick 
"yes", 1/3 of the overall sample (i.e., 4 Avalonians) have to be subtracted from these 8 “yes” 
ticking Avalonians. The outcome of this is 4 Avalonians who honestly ticked "yes". In 
comparison with those 4 who ticked "no", this means: Half of the Avalonians used witchcraft 
to make a better impression in their last job interview, and the other half did not. This is also 
illustrated by Figure A1. 
 
 
Figure A1 
An illustration of the randomized response technique (RRT)  
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